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**WORLD VIEW:
THE 1996 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FROM THE STRATEGIC STUDIES
INSTITUTE**

**Edited by
Earl H. Tilford, Jr.**

February 1, 1996

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FOREWORD

The analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) annually assess the strategic equation for their particular area of interest. This year they were asked to consider not only the next 12-18 months, but also to look 10 years ahead and to think about the future as it might affect both the nation and the Army. From the strategic context that they envision, SSI is producing its 1996 Study Program. This process provides the transition from the general strategic context to individual studies.

These 1996 strategic assessments are crucial for two reasons. First, the post-Cold War world remains complex. These complexities present the nation and the Army with diverse and potentially perilous challenges. To remain the world's best Army in the 21st century, we must define clearly today the strategic challenges we may face tomorrow. Second, the Army is addressing this strategic context at a crucial juncture when it has nearly completed its planned downsizing and has begun to transform its vision of the future into modernization requirements through the Force XXI process. That transformation is threatened by continued pressures to reduce Army spending.

SSI offers this year's *World View* assessment in the hope that it will be of value both to those charged with converting Force XXI into the Army of the 21st century, and those who share an interest in our success.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

INTRODUCTION

Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Each January the regional analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, assess global trends that appear likely to determine the state of the world through the next decade. This year, SSI is attempting to integrate its "World View" with an assessment of how the Army of the 21st century will operate within a strategic environment that is both dynamic and uncertain. From these assessments of the world and the Army's future, SSI analysts devise study proposals which address those issues and threats that impact on the requirements for structuring an Army for the 21st century.

Addressing the Strategic Landscape.

Several rather general strategic trends are apparent. Through the year 2006, the United States is unlikely to be confronted with a threat posed by a true global peer competitor. While Russia and China and, to a lesser extent, Japan, have the potential to become regional peer competitors, obstacles exist which may prevent them from doing so. In any event, it is not likely that they will be able, or perhaps even want, to pose such a challenge to the United States in the foreseeable future.

It may well be that what was known as the post-Cold War period has ended. If the December 1995 elections are any indication, Russia is edging backward into its future as large numbers of Russians, ordinary citizens and political figures alike, seem to long for a return to the stability and perceived national glories of their Soviet past. Meanwhile, Russian troops remain heavily engaged in Chechnya and in peacekeeping operations elsewhere around the southwestern periphery of the nation. No matter what direction Russia may take, it will have significant strategic implications for the United States and the West. Whether market-oriented reforms continue or Russia lapses into a more tightly state-controlled economy, it will be subjected to the harsh realities of long-term economic problems. While these factors will limit its ability to revive its military, the fact that Russia possess thousands of nuclear weapons means it will remain a significant factor in the strategic equation.

Even as 1996 began, U.S. Army units were moving into Bosnia to perform a massive and potentially dangerous peacekeeping mission with their NATO and non-NATO counterparts. Although a peace agreement has been signed, the volatile mixtures of age-old hatreds and animosities remain. While no one can predict with any certainty what the outcome of the Bosnian operation may be, the sure thing is that the implications for NATO and the future of European security extend well beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia.

In the Middle East, Israel, Syria, and the Palestinians face the most difficult challenges of their long and tortured negotiations: the status of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and the extent to which the Palestinians will have a truly independent state. Elsewhere, Iraq continues to pose a threat to its Persian Gulf neighbors, and through persistent efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, to everyone else in the region as well. Meanwhile, Iran looms on the strategic horizon as a significant threat just as Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern allies may be facing increasing pressure to limit their relationship with the United States and Western European powers.

China is the big unknown in the Far East. Whether China will continue with market reforms while moderating its stance on human rights is uncertain. What is sure is that China is modernizing its armed forces, although it probably will not be capable of effective combined operations for many years. The extent to which China poses a threat to its neighbors and to the strategic interests of the United States is, however, uncertain. Elsewhere, while tensions remain high on the Korean Peninsula, in Vietnam, now that Washington and Hanoi have normalized relations, the two countries can seek wider areas of cooperation.

Japan is the economic powerhouse of Asia. It has the ability to harness its economy to become a major military power. If Japan so chooses, however, such a course might endanger its status as an economic superpower and antagonize every country in Asia.

For Africa, 1995 was a relatively peaceful year. Yet, potential trouble spots abound and are both acute and significant in Zaire and Nigeria. Throughout the continent, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, corrupt governments, infectious diseases, and high population growth continue as sources of concern.

South America remains a continent beset by rapidly expanding populations and persistent poverty. These problems will continue to compel scores of thousands to migrate--most legally--into the United States. If, after U.S. and U.N. forces leave Haiti, there is a return to politically-motivated violence, the potential for increased migration will be high in 1996.

Major Strategic Determinants: 1996-2006.

From the perspective of 1996, SSI's analysts estimate that the following 18 major determinants will influence the Army's posture, U.S. vital or strategic interests, and the national military strategy over the coming decade.

Looking out to 2006, in part due to the advent of the Information Age, there will be systemic changes in the way major governmental and private institutions are structured. There will be major changes in the way nations and peoples govern themselves, how they educate their young, organize their armed forces, and deal with the environment.

In the near term, two factors will affect the U.S. Army: the outcome of operations in Bosnia and the 1996 national elections. How the Army performs, or is perceived as performing in Bosnia, will affect how it is viewed by the American people. That can have both long- and short-term effects on recruiting, retention, and the kind of support the Army receives from Congress. Barring unforeseen events, the Defense Budget is likely to decline no matter what the outcome of the November elections. But issues raised in the attendant debates could affect the overall rate of decrease in defense spending.

Russia's rugged road to democracy will become even more arduous with the probable reemergence of the Communists as a potent political force. This will only add to the challenges posed by lawlessness, massive ecological degeneration, rebellion in the Caucasus and a struggling economy.

No matter what happens politically or economically, Russia will likely pursue policies and objectives which conflict with those of the United States and the European democracies. Whether or not Russia will have a conventional military establishment that is the "peer" to that of the United States, it will be powerful enough to constitute a major strategic threat given its nuclear capabilities.

The Asia-Pacific Region will be one of the world's most economically dynamic areas throughout the coming decade. The role China will play is the major factor in the strategic equation. Disputes over Taiwan and the Spratly Islands could reach crisis proportions relatively soon. China's nuclear capability is a growing concern.

In the near term, relations between Seoul and Pyongyang are not going to improve. The United States will be a part of this confrontation as a result of its political and military commitments to South Korea because of the U.S.-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Agreed Framework on nuclear power issues. If fighting breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. forces will be involved.

Through the next decade, Europe will be the region where significant political-military and economic developments affect the economic order. NATO will remain the premier security organization in Europe as emerging democracies in Central and Western Europe struggle toward open societies and free market economies.

In 1996, the wars in the former Yugoslavia will be a dominant concern among European policymakers. Implementing the Bosnian Peace Settlement could strain the NATO Alliance. The ultimate resolution of events in Bosnia, and the roles NATO and Russia play in how that unfolds, will impact the future of Europe in numerous ways.

The issue of NATO enlargement will continue over the next decade as Alliance members debate how and when to effect it. The way NATO enlarges and which countries will be included will affect the West's relations with Russia and will be influenced, to some extent, by the future political direction taken by Russia.

Through 2006, in Latin America, a rapidly expanding urban population and problems associated with poverty will foster unrest, subversion, terrorism, insurgency and coups d'etat. The United States will feel the impact in the form of illegal migration, increased drug trafficking, and possible repeated deployments of U.S. forces in various peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. Elsewhere, it is uncertain what effect the relinquishing of the Panama Canal in 1999 will have, but since the canal is a major strategic waterway, the implications could be significant.

Drug trafficking will continue as a major problem throughout Latin America. As long as the U.S. market remains lucrative, the lure of coca cultivation and cocaine production will continue.

By 2006, Cuba likely will have entered a post-Castro transition resulting from the dictator's death or removal from power. If political instability and violence result, the United States may be compelled to intervene militarily. That will mean Army and Marine units deploying to a far more threatening environment than they found in Haiti in 1994.

In 1996, Arabs and Israelis will have to deal with the most difficult issues remaining in their peace talks. The United States will remain the only nation that can act as an honest broker between Israel, Syria and the Palestinians.

Throughout the Middle East the disparity in the distribution of wealth will continue. A high birth rate will exacerbate the problem by insuring that a youthful population predominates.

By the beginning of the 21st century, Muslims throughout the Middle East will demand that the Western powers, especially the United States, withdraw from the Persian Gulf. The House of Saud will be pressured increasingly to limit its support for the United States. Without Saudi Arabia, the United States will be unable to find a reliable surrogate to police the area.

Before 2006, Iran may pose a major threat as a regional hegemon, if not an aspiring regional peer competitor. If Iran and Iraq put aside old differences to present a united front, the United States and its Middle Eastern friends and allies will face a significant strategic challenge.

In Africa, conventional, interstate war in the Sub-Saharan region is unlikely. The challenge will be to prevent the spread of conflict from one country to another.

Conditions in Africa's strategic giants, Zaire, Nigeria, and South Africa, will be vital to determining the short-term stability of the region. If Zaire and Nigeria disintegrate into anarchy or violence, Africa will face its greatest security challenge since the decolonization period of the early 1960s.

Over the next decade, the world will remain unpredictable, dangerous, and violent. The Army, facing declining budgets, must meet the challenge of remaining effective in support and peacekeeping operations while staying ready to be a decisive and strategic force in war.

In 1996, the way the Bosnian operation unfolds will be crucial. Developments in the Middle East will reach a crucial stage as Israel, Syria and the Palestinians work to settle the most contentious issues. The Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, Spratly Islands, and Cuba all bear watching. Long-term strategic concerns, however, must focus on Russia and China. Whatever directions those nations take will, inevitably, affect the United States and the Western democracies.

THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Steven Metz

General Assessment.

A great historic transformation is underway. For several decades, the global security environment has faced a series of increasingly intense challenges. Throughout this century, among the most prominent have been the rise of totalitarianism, the independence and modernization of the Third World, the dissemination of global power from Western Europe, the resurgence of traditional forms of personal identity as seen in religious fundamentalism and ethnic violence, an explosion in global communication, the coalescence of international values, and the emergence of post-industrial economies. Today, while the ultimate effect of this change is uncertain, its magnitude is clear.

Transitions in the global security environment are never quick and complete. Old systemic structures, practices, and values tend to linger even as new ones emerge. This gives extraordinary importance to choices made during periods of transition, particularly by the major powers. Decisions, policies, and programs which evolve over the next few years will thus shape world events for decades to come. The U.S. military, as it attempts to understand the changing global security environment and assesses its future role, will play a part in this decisionmaking. A key step is deciding which of the many changes under way are strategically significant.

Trends and Issues.

Three trends will be particularly important in shaping the future global security environment. These trends and the issues raised by them follow.

The Changing Structure of the International System. The macro-level structure of the international system will be the single most important determinant of future U.S. security strategy, affecting both how and why military force is used. It will help determine who (or what) are allies and enemies of the United States, and what sort of armed force, skills, equipment, training, and doctrine will be needed. While contemporary strategists cannot know precisely what form the future international system will take, they can develop an array of feasible alternatives, each with its own set of military implications. These might include the following:

- A unipolar system dominated by the United States;
- An unstructured state system;
- A polyglot system with very large, very small and middle-sized components;

- _ A "civilization" based system;
- _ A three-tiered system based on the dominant economic form;
- _ A bifurcated system divided by governability.

Which of these systems actually emerges will be determined by:

The ability of world leaders to replace violence-inducing ideological, political, ethnic, racial, economic, or religious schisms with shared values and identity;

The continued primacy of the nation-state versus its replacement by other types of political organizations;

The ability of states to sustain internal order and meet public needs and expectations;

The pace and extent of economic, political, and cultural integration among developed states and regions;

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or, more importantly, their use;

The ability of advanced states to build post-petroleum and post-industrial economies;

The ability of developing states to control population and find ecologically-safe methods of economic growth;

- _ The impact of the revolution in military affairs.

As the future international system takes shape, U.S. policymakers and strategists must answer three questions:

Which future international system is most likely to emerge?

Which future international system would the United States prefer?

How can U.S. national security and national military strategy best encourage the development of the preferred future international system?

The Changing Concept of Security. The concept of security is undergoing its greatest challenge since the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles during the Cold War. Two trends are particularly important:

The erosion of sovereignty and a declining emphasis on national in favor of regional or global security. Interdependence

and communications are the driving forces behind this trend as world leaders recognize that instability in one state or conflict between two states invariably affects others.

The emergence of new security threats. Previously, the primary threats to security were attack by another nation-state or politically-motivated insurgency. In the emerging global security environment, transnational or even transregional organized crime, information warfare, and ecological and public health dangers will be increasingly important security threats, and may eventually become the preeminent ones.

The Changing Nature of Armed Forces. As the international system and the concept of security change, so too must armed forces. Nearly every nation must now grapple with three key strategic questions:

What are the appropriate roles and missions for armed forces? Should they be redesigned to deal with new threats like transnational crime, information warfare, and ecological terrorism, or should other organizations confront these problems?

How can armed forces retain political unity in a world where every use of force comes under intense public scrutiny? Many elements of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) such as the emphasis on stand-off, precision munitions, robotics, and nonlethal weapons are intended to reinvigorate the political utility of military force by minimizing casualties and collateral damage. The success military strategists have in developing technological solutions to the problems associated with the declining political utility of military force will have a major impact on the future global security environment.

How can the nations of the world afford future armed forces? To some extent, the RMA, by holding the possibility that a small, very advanced armed force might be as effective as a larger, less advanced one, is also intended to make military power more affordable. It is not yet clear whether this will succeed. Moreover, there are questions as to whether traditional methods of augmenting the affordability of security, like the use of reserve components and reliance on allies, will be compatible with the revolution in military affairs.

RUSSIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

Stephen J. Blank

Regional Assessment.

The prospects for Russia and the CIS to 2006 are rather dispiriting. If the trends discussed below do in fact persist, the future of the former Soviet Union (FSU) will be no happier than its past.

As 1995 unfolded, Boris Yeltsin seemingly embraced policies devised to enforce centralization throughout the CIS. Any effort to impose a centralized union on the republics in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, Ukraine, or the Baltic States could prove explosive. This trend, however, indicates the persistence of the neo-imperial impulse and the power of its proponents in Russia. These are problems with long-term effects.

But Russia also faces internal threats. Neo-imperialism and hyper-nationalism threaten Russia in a significant way. Focusing on the perceived glories of a Soviet or Imperial Russian past diverts attention from more pressing issues: lawlessness, massive ecological degeneration, and a worsening health crisis. These, likewise, are problems with long-term effects.

Russia will continue to confront the problem of its domestic political maturation. There is little understanding among the political elites in Russia of the seriousness of the real threats which face the nation. Many are seemingly obsessed with healing Russia's wounded imperial pride. Short-term political interests dominate the discussion among those who are jockeying for position as the 1996 Russian presidential elections draw near. The December 1995 parliamentary elections proved most significant in that the Communists and their allies won about a third of the seats in the Duma. Meanwhile, the country continues to disintegrate.

The absence of legitimate, law-based, and coherent governmental institutions will likely continue. Impotent governments riddled with corruption in Russia and the republics will be ineffectual in curbing the ongoing breakdown of law and order. There are signs of fusion between gangsters on the one hand and business, government and military elites on the other.

Ecological devastation presents another long-term threat. Accompanying and exacerbating the ecological devastation is a deepening crisis in health care. Pathologies of all kinds will beset a declining population which will become increasingly susceptible to disease as food growing and distribution systems become less effective. Russia's population is decreasing and if that trend continues, some estimates are that by the middle of the 21st century its population could have dropped from the present 147 million to under 60 million. Unless something is done

to correct these problems, the consequences could become staggeringly evident by as early as 2006.

For now, Russia will continue to struggle with its slow and painful transformation from Communism to something resembling democracy. At some point, perhaps as soon as the 1996 Russian presidential elections, the former Communist Party may experience a dramatic political revival. Even if the forces of democracy prevail, it is likely Russia will oscillate between grudging cooperation with the West and anti-Western policies devised to pursue and attain traditional Russian national interests.

The transformation from a centralized, state-controlled economy to a free market economy will be no less tortured. Over the next decade Russia should make the transition to a form of capitalism in which there is heavy state participation and regulation. It may well resemble the capitalist models that have emerged in some central European countries and, to an extent, that version of capitalism devised by Serge Witte during the reign of Nicholas II.

The Russian military cannot afford its current force structure. It will be less able to do so as the next decade unfolds. As conventional forces become less and less viable, Russia will rely more on its nuclear forces for deterrence and also to compel and support Russian objectives in Europe and Asia. Simultaneously, given the likelihood of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (to which Russia is contributing) and South Asia, and China's continuing military modernization, Russian military elites will try to latch onto the benefits of the RMA as best they can in an effort to move Russian armed forces into the Information Age. Meanwhile, Russian forces may have to devote considerable resources to Chechnya-like operations at home and to support Bosnia-type operations abroad in conjunction with United Nations and NATO forces, thereby reducing modernization resources.

Trends and Issues.

Given that Russian policy processes for national security remain uncoordinated and incoherent, the following trends and issues are likely to persist through the next decade.

— Russian opposition to NATO expansion will continue. Success in the current cooperative effort between NATO and Russian forces in Bosnia may serve to attenuate Moscow's current opposition to NATO's expansion. If cooperation can be achieved in the Balkans and then on the issue of NATO expansion, it might become the model for East-West cooperation in Europe.

— Despite Russian rhetoric, NATO may expand eastward. If the rhetoric grows louder and is voiced by a Communist-controlled government, NATO may well expand even faster. Unless there is a

new Concert of Europe, it is unlikely that Russia will ever become a member of NATO.

Civil-military relations may break down completely. No effective, democratic civilian form of control over the military is discernible. Military politicization will intensify.

Complicating their defense financial problems, the Russian armed forces will remain engaged in a wide range of pacification operations in its border regions and among "breakaway" republics. Military operations under the guise of peace operations, like those currently being conducted in Georgia and Tajikistan, are likely to proliferate. Prospects for military or political success are dubious.

The Russian Army and Navy will become increasingly less capable into the first decade of the 21st century. There will be attempts to incorporate some elements of the ongoing military technological revolution into portions of the armed forces, but the Russian military will probably not experience a revolution in military affairs.

Russia will employ every means at its disposal to undermine the sovereignty of breakaway former Soviet republics, not to mention Chechnya. Over the next decade, Moscow is likely to face increasing resistance from the republics themselves and from the West, as European and American interests and investments in the republics increase. By 2006, if East-West relations in Europe deteriorate, international rivalry will intensify in the former republics of the Soviet Union.

Russia may not be able to articulate a viable security and economic policy for Asia. This will have the greatest repercussions in Northeast Asia where Russo-Japanese relations will deteriorate and Russia will find it increasingly difficult to play a major role in developments between the Koreans. Barring dramatic changes in Russia or China, by 2006 Russia will have slipped behind China economically. Moscow would find itself a junior partner in any relationship that might develop with Beijing.

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Stephen J. Blank

Regional Assessment.

This region can be divided into north and south. The dominating issue among the nations in the north, the Baltic republics, Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary, is gaining membership in NATO. Their policies are directed to that end and their militaries are reorganizing and restructuring with NATO membership in mind. By 2006, if NATO expansion in the north does not include the Baltic states (and Ukraine as well), Russian pressure on those states will increase. The West, including an expanded NATO, might have to bring pressure to bear to respond to Russian threats to Baltic and Ukrainian independence.

NATO membership and joining the European Union (EU) are critical issues for Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Romania. Turkey (already a NATO member) is focused on attaining membership in the EU, which is unlikely to happen by 2006. For all the Balkan states, the war in the former Yugoslavia is critical. If the peace in Bosnia brokered by the United States holds, it will have a positive effect on all Balkan relationships. But, in any case, the future of the former Yugoslavia will affect the shape of the Balkan peninsula as a whole, and that is of major concern to every Balkan state, including Macedonia and Albania. Failure to achieve or enforce a macro-level peace in Bosnia could undermine NATO unity as well as the power of the very institution to which East and Central Europeans look for future security.

Trends and Issues.

In Central and Eastern Europe, key trends and issues to 2006 are listed below.

Over the next decade, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic may enter NATO. Most Central and East European states should revive economically by 2006 and be prepared for entry into the European Union.

From 1996 into the next decade, Central and Eastern European states will stay focused on restructuring and reequipping their militaries to support their entry into NATO. The Partnership for Peace (PfP), along with other bilateral and multilateral programs, will play an integral part in facilitating this process.

For the immediate future, keeping the peace in Bosnia will be of paramount importance for the Balkans. With NATO units committed to the peace enforcement mission in Bosnia, the ultimate outcome of the peace process is vitally important. Success could foster new ways and mechanisms for preventing

ethnic conflicts or of resolving them. Failure could undermine the peace of Europe.

— If the West and Russia can, indeed, find common ground for cooperation over Central and Eastern Europe, there will be further progress in European security issues.

— Russia can be expected to keep up the pressure on the Baltic states and Ukraine to remain out of NATO and within a Russian security sphere. Moscow will pursue this course for ethnic as well as geopolitical reasons.

WESTERN EUROPE: 1996-2006

**William T. Johnsen
Thomas-Durell Young**

Regional Assessment to 2006.

European security affairs and events continue to dominate the foreign policy of the United States. Notwithstanding the continuing economic growth and increased political importance of East Asia, Europe remains the region where the most significant political-military developments for the existing international order occur. U.S. allies and partners continue to provide crucial support to the United States in pursuit of mutual worldwide objectives.

European political, economic and monetary integration continue, albeit at a cautious pace and along divergent tracks. The EU will enlarge over the next decade, but predominantly in the economic sphere with political integration and the creation of a common foreign and security policy limited to core states of the Union. An unintended by-product of European integration has been the increased growth of regional economic ties that undermine the traditional concept of state sovereignty and national cohesion.

In the security arena, the Alliance continues its evolutionary development begun in 1990. Further implementation of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept (November 1991), reform of NATO's command and control structures, initiation and subsequent growth of the highly successful Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, publication of the Alliance's Enlargement Study, increasing (but selective) French cooperation in NATO military affairs, and the Alliance's role in implementing the Bosnian peace agreement have moved NATO dramatically forward. These events have both strengthened NATO and provided further impetus to the development of the Alliance's twin pillars.

It is our opinion that throughout the next 10 years, ethnic issues will vex European policymakers. Ethnic conflicts, even if nonviolent, will affect internal and international European politics. Emigration from the Maghreb, the Middle East and Eastern Europe to Western Europe will strain the social fabric and social welfare systems of the latter.

The emerging democracies in Central and Western Europe will struggle along their respective paths toward free market economies and open societies. For the most part, progress will be episodic and specific to each nation's socio-political and cultural context. A potential problem for internal stability and interstate relations is the growth in criminal activity and violence emanating from these states toward Western Europe.

Regional Assessment for the Short Term.

Over the short term, European security remains fraught with unknowns and risks, yet recent developments are encouraging. The dire predictions of pundits who foresaw a new cold war, or the disintegration of NATO, have not been realized. Participation in the implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement added impetus to reform efforts. For example, French acknowledgement that NATO remains the premier security organization in Europe has resulted in increased and more open cooperation from Paris in the military activities of the Alliance.

For the next year and perhaps beyond, the wars in the former Yugoslavia will dominate European attention. Earlier fears that the conflict might spread have not been realized. Recent cracks within the Alliance over NATO participation in achieving a lasting peace settlement have been addressed. Implementing the Bosnian Peace Settlement will undoubtedly strain cooperation within the Alliance, but these issues will be resolved and the Alliance strengthened for the long term.

The prospects for the Alliance's enlargement in the more immediate future remain a hotly debated issue in every European capital, most particularly in Moscow. With the publication of the NATO study on enlargement, focus has shifted from how and why to when and who. Answers to those questions involve more politics than policy, but remain of the utmost importance, especially vis-a-vis Russia and its relationship to Western Europe.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program of the Alliance has far exceeded the expectations of most critics. The military and political bases for expansion are being developed in many key Eastern countries. Given the necessity for both the Alliance and its partners to be seen as making progress in this area, PfP's visibility and activities can be expected to grow. Residual difficulties with establishing appropriate civil-military relations in some partner states may hinder progress.

Though not widely perceived, Greek-Turkish frictions hold the potential to fracture the Alliance. The Aegean shelf, air and sea space, NATO command structures, and Cyprus remain contentious points capable of fostering disruptions that almost defy resolution. While seemingly bilateral in nature, these frictions have begun to have a negative effect on the way business is conducted in the Alliance.

In 1996 the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of the EU is scheduled to review, *inter alia*, its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). A number of factors, including the election and subsequent policies promulgated by French President Jacques Chirac, have called into question the ability of the EU to find consensus and to achieve the difficult goals of the CFSP. The outcome of this conference will affect the North Atlantic Alliance and its evolving relationship with the Western European Union.

Trends and Issues.

Progress on "deepening" the EU will continue to slow. In an effort to demonstrate "progress," the IGC may well recommend symbolic initiatives.

Increased decentralization within Western Europe (e.g., Belgium, Spain, and Italy) may lead to weak governments. Such a condition could, on the one hand, result in weak governments that are unable to reach decisions, thereby debilitating NATO. On the other hand, ineffective governments may lead to statal disintegration and instability in Western Europe. Such a condition could also result from increasing economic regionalization in Western Europe (e.g., the Lyon, Barcelona, Turin triangle), that reduces the effectiveness of the centralized nation-state.

Massive refugee flows stemming from conflict in Europe (e.g., the former Yugoslavia and Central Europe) or the periphery (e.g., the Maghreb) may overcome Western European social systems, generating considerable instability.

There will be increasing intolerance to migration and non-European ethnic communities in Europe resulting in ethnic conflict in Central and Eastern Europe that destabilizes existing regimes.

Ecological disasters in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics have a real potential to increase East-West tensions.

Progress on NATO enlargement will slow as the Alliance moves into the debate on when and how to effect it. New members will be added after the turn of the century, but expansion will be slower than many now anticipate.

The Partnership for Peace will increase in importance and will serve as a means for improved cooperation between NATO and the partner states.

In the near term, events in the Balkans will preoccupy NATO and divert attention from other pressing issues, such as enlargement, reform of command structures, and national and Alliance force structures. Success in Bosnia, however, could accelerate resolving these issues in the long term.

The overly national direction in French external policy will remain nettlesome for France's allies.

Greek-Turkish tensions will continue to impede the conduct of business in NATO.

Italy will follow its precarious path toward democratic reformation and strategic reassessment.

Continued warfare in the Transcaucasus will contribute to instability in Russia and Turkey.

LATIN AMERICA

Donald E. Schulz

Regional Assessment.

At least through 2006, threats to peace, stability, progressive growth, and democracy in Latin America will come from political extremes and deeply-rooted economic, social and political problems. U.S. national interests in the region will remain basically the same a decade from now as they are today. Washington will continue its commitment to promoting democracy, sustainable economic growth, a greater regard for human rights, higher living standards, and curtailment of the drug trade and illegal migration into the United States. Most countries will continue the process of democratization, but a few will experience authoritarian restorations. This trend will be especially apparent where democratically-elected governments have failed to meet popular expectations.

A rapidly expanding urban population with the attendant socio-economic problems associated with decapitalization, violent crime, and drug abuse, will create conditions promoting emigration, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, and *coups d'etat*. Assistance from the United States to reinforce democratic institutions and build strong economies will continue to be the best defense against authoritarian alternatives manifesting themselves throughout the region.

In the Andean Ridge countries of Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, thousands of farmers will continue to engage in the lucrative coca growing business, and narcotraffickers will conduct related--and even more lucrative--cocaine processing activities. Venezuela and Brazil will become significant producers as well as way stations for smugglers. In Mexico, Central America and South America, poppy cultivation will increase. Unless suitable alternatives are found, farmers will provide the raw materials to support both insurgents and drug trafficking cartels. Even with U.S. training, equipment, and advisors, Latin American governments will only be able to make limited progress against the supply side of the drug trade. Increasingly, these activities will be fueled by the growing use of illegal drugs in Latin America itself.

Economic underdevelopment and wide gaps between rich and poor will continue to produce high levels of illegal migration of Latin Americans into the United States, most coming from or through Mexico. To these refugees seeking economic opportunities will be added those who claim to be fleeing political persecution. Caribbean migration will increase substantially and could very well reach crisis proportions, especially if the Castro regime comes to a violent end. Economic hardship in Cuba will continue to provide a strong incentive for emigration, and if relations with Washington remain poor, Castro may encourage

further exoduses to release domestic political pressures or to retaliate against the United States. Economic hardship and political violence will continue to push Haitians towards the United States. By the 21st century, if not before, immigration from the Dominican Republic will also be a problem.

The policy answer to most of these concerns is the nurturing of democracy and sustainable economic growth leading to a higher standard of living for most Latin Americans. A viable counterdrug strategy is also needed. Some of these issues have been addressed in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Andean Drug Strategy. How to turn policy into strategy and executable programs is the real challenge for the United States.

Trends and Issues.

Threats to democratic governments will increase as a result of overpopulation, socio-economic inequalities, poverty, weak economies, an authoritarian political culture, corruption, human rights abuses, and civil-military conflicts. These elements may be exploited by drug cartels, radical politicians from the right and left, unreconstructed Marxists, and the armed forces.

Environmental degradation and exploitation of nonrenewable resources will continue. A major ecological disaster is in the making in the Amazon.

Peru and Colombia will continue to be plagued by a chronic mix of insurgency and drug trafficking.

In the immediate future, the socio-economic crisis in Venezuela will worsen, further undermining democracy and fostering political instability.

The Ecuador-Peru border dispute will continue to smolder, with a renewed outbreak of fighting always a possibility. There is also a possibility that the arms race between these two countries could spread throughout the region, posing a security challenge for United States.

The Central American peace process will gradually fade leaving unresolved socio-economic and political problems that will undermine democracy and cause political instability. Levels of criminal violence, already extremely high, will increase in the short run and remain a serious problem past 2006. A regression to more authoritarian practices is likely in one or more countries, with Venezuela being a prime candidate.

Illegal immigration and drug trafficking will continue to pose major social, economic and political problems for the United States.

The political crisis in Haiti is likely to reemerge when U.S./U.N. peacekeeping forces withdraw. Political instability, violence and authoritarian rule will return. Haiti will not be able to reverse the process of socio-economic ruin which has marked its history for 200 years. Pressures to emigrate will remain enormous.

The socio-economic crisis in Cuba will continue, although it would be harder for the economy to become any flatter. Therefore, since things could not get much worse, a gradual recovery is possible, although if the current political circumstances remain, Cuba will still be economically challenged in 2006. The situation will become increasingly uncertain, given Castro's age and the inevitable health problems that accompany aging. Another crucial imponderable is U.S. policy, which could either shore up the regime's authoritarian control system or undermine it by helping to open the country to outside influences.

There is a good chance that Cuba will enter a post-Castro transition between now and 2006. If this occurs as a result of the dictator's death or overthrow, it could prompt political instability and violence. Under such circumstances, the United States may be tempted to intervene militarily.

The United States and Panama will probably reach an agreement to allow for a continued, if much reduced, U.S. military presence along the canal. The United States Southern Command will relocate to Miami in 1997. Panama will experience problems maintaining and using the properties turned over to it. Whether the canal will be run in a reasonably efficient manner depends on the extent to which its management is undermined by political corruption and interference.

By 2006, the Mexican political and socio-economic crises will persist, with each feeding on the other to make recovery more difficult as time goes by. Economic recuperation will be slower and consequences will continue to be painful. Neoliberal economic policies, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), will continue to pose major socio-economic adjustment problems, especially for agriculture. Political instability could result as Mexico attempts a difficult simultaneous transition to democracy and a free-market economy. Nevertheless, Mexico will probably muddle through.

For the immediate future, the outlook for Brazil is more optimistic than it has been in years. A popular and energetic new president is introducing economic reforms. Inflation is down and business is booming. Over the longer run, however, major social and economic challenges remain to include a highly inequitable income distribution, violent crime, and severe environmental degradation, especially in the Amazon.

In the short run, at least, the movement to expand NAFTA into a broader regional free trade agreement will stall.

Subregional integration efforts, such as MERCOSUR,* will continue and the movement towards hemisphere-wide integration will regain momentum over time.

The United States will continue to support democratization throughout the region. Though Washington will be less inclined to intervene militarily, continued political instability in the Caribbean Basin will probably lead to one or more such interventions during the next decade, with Haiti and Cuba being among the most likely candidates.

@ASTERICKTEXT = * The Southern Common Market comprising Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Stephen C. Pelletiere

Regional Assessment to 2006.

A number of indicators extant today can be used to project the strategic environment in the Middle East to 2006. Unless these indicators change significantly, the environment for the first 5 years of the next century will be set by the year 2000. The speed with which the events are moving in the Middle East makes it likely that the shape that part of the world will take by 2006 will be clearly discernable by the end of 1999. The United States and its allies will continue to depend on the Persian Gulf for much of their oil supplies. Therefore, access to the Gulf will be a major U.S. foreign policy tenet.

The economic outlook will be bleak for the next decade. Wealth in the Middle East is unevenly distributed and it is unlikely that there will be any significant alleviation of depressed economic conditions by 2006. Any economic assistance that is available will come through the World Bank with stringent requirements for qualifying. Demographic growth will exacerbate the economic problem with a high birth rate insuring that the area's youthful population will predominate.

Political diversity will be the rule across the Middle East. But political consciousness will be universal, particularly among the young, who will insist on government sponsored solutions to economic ills. Widespread anger will result when governments cannot or will not institute social welfare solutions.

A crisis will develop over the legitimacy of the House of Saud. The royal family will come under increasing pressure from conservative elements in the society. This will affect U.S.-Saudi relations and U.S. freedom of action in the Gulf.

Muslims throughout the Middle East will demand that the Persian Gulf be purged of the Western military presence. This is a demand neither Riyadh nor Washington will be able or inclined to satisfy. For its part, Washington will be unable to find a surrogate capable of policing the Gulf in its absence.

Short-Term Assessment.

In May 1996, when the last round of the Arab-Israeli peace talks takes place, a crucial deadline will be reached in the Middle East. Problems with a potential for stalling or wrecking the peace process have been deferred. But in May it will be time to deal with difficult issues like the fate of Jerusalem and a truly independent Palestinian state.

The Israelis will be more sensitive to the demands of the right, especially following Yitzak Rabin's assassination. It will

be harder for Israel to make concessions on the issue of Jerusalem, Palestinian statehood, and the Golan Heights. The Arab negotiators are not likely to lessen their demands because they, too, have constituents pressing them to be firm. It will be difficult, even with the good offices of the United States as mediator, to settle the complex issues given the current political environment.

The bomb that went off in front of Saudi National Guard headquarters in Riyadh is indicative of what lies ahead. Devout Saudis, indeed the majority of Muslims, increasingly resent what they perceive to be U. S. encroachment on the sacred precincts of the faith. They want U.S. military forces out of the region, especially off the Arabian Peninsula which is the home of Mecca and Medina, two of Islam's most sacred places. Washington, however, will not embrace any policy which jeopardizes the security of Saudi Arabia or access to the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the United States can expect to encounter increasing hostility toward American forces in the region and toward the Saudi regime that invited them there.

Washington's contention that U.S. forces must remain in the Gulf to deter Iraq is not viewed as credible by a large portion of the people of the region. Many contend that Washington has manufactured the "Iraqi threat" to establish a military presence in the Gulf and as a way of taking direct control of this vital oil-producing region.

Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and the military junta in Algeria have shown that they can stand up to dissident fundamentalist forces even though they lack the popular support needed to overcome them. Hence, unrest in these two states will continue with government security forces and fundamentalists locked in an ever-mounting spiral of violence which most Egyptians and Algerians look on with disdain.

In Turkey, the Kurdish stalemate persists. U.S. policymakers expected the Iraqi regime to crumble in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War and the continuing economic embargo. Therefore, no real provision was made for the future of the Kurds. The embargo imposed on Iraq by the United States to topple Saddam Hussein applies to the Kurdish people as well. Hence, what the Arab Iraqis suffer the Kurdish Iraqis also suffer. Meanwhile, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), with aid from Syria, will continue to operate within Iraq.

Trends and Issues.

— In the long term, expect a new theater of crisis to emerge in the Horn of Africa, pitting the United States, Egypt, and Israel against significant unrest in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.

By 2006, Iran and Iraq could present a combined threat to the United States. Iran may supplant Iraq as the primary threat to the Gulf region.

In the more immediate future, the Peace Process will become increasingly contentious as Arabs and Israelis are forced to deal with the difficult issues deferred until now.

Unrest in Egypt will intensify as a result of Mubarak's attempts to muzzle the opposition during the November elections. There will be a significant backlash against the regime.

The situation in Algeria will continue to deteriorate with neither side able to prevail.

If Syria is to make peace with Israel, it will be on Israel's terms. The alternative for Damascus is uncertain and largely unknown since Hafez Assad has played a very closed hand.

In Israel, the Likud Party has a good chance of replacing the Labor Party in the next elections. This will create friction with the United States, which has traditionally experienced difficulty in working with Israel's right wing.

Movement of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, if it occurs, will exacerbate U.S. relations with regimes throughout the region and create pressures on those which host any U.S. presence.

AFRICA

Steven Metz

Regional Assessment.

While 1994 was a year of great events for Sub-Saharan Africa, from the historic transition to multi-ethnic democracy in South Africa to the unspeakable horrors of Rwanda, 1995 unfolded more placidly. Danger persisted and the structural foundation of violence remained intact, but a few of the region's oldest conflicts lurched toward settlement and there were no new human disasters. All considered, it was not a bad year for African security, raising hopes that 1996 will bring even more positive developments.

In August 1995, the belligerents in two of Africa's oldest and most destructive civil wars signed peace accords. Jonas Savimbi, leader of the once-powerful UNITA movement in Angola, appeared to abandon his quest for total control of the country and accepted an appointment as vice president in a coalition government. At about the same time, a half-dozen warring factions in Liberia agreed to end their conflict. Both of these settlements are fragile, but with outside support Angola and Liberia could begin repairing the human and physical damage from decades of violence. In 1995 there were some gains for political freedom as well. Uganda, for instance, appeared to be moving away from a "no party" political system to a more open one, and other states continued to consolidate recent democratic reforms.

Unfortunately, every peaceful settlement seemed counterbalanced by a persisting conflict. The brutal civil war in Sierra Leone, initially sparked by the violence in neighboring Liberia, continued. There have been at least 10,000 deaths, with most of the victims hacked to pieces in their villages. Many others are starving to death as a result of the war, and nearly half the country's population are refugees. In Sao Tome, a coup briefly ousted President Miguel Trovoadá, reminding the world that military intervention always lurks in the background for African democracies. Rwanda lingers an incident away from renewed violence, with former soldiers and militiamen rearming in Hutu refugee camps and threatening to reignite their country's civil war. A government shakeup in August 1995 endangered the Hutu/Tutsi coalition and further discouraged Hutu refugees during the summer; hundreds of thousands fled the camps, further eroding Zaire's fragile stability. Rwanda's neighbor Burundi, with a similar ethnic make-up and history of violence, remained a half step from explosion. A dozen other states are equally incendiary: all across Africa, thousands of youths have been drafted into rebel armies or forced to participate in ethnic killing. They form part of a culture of violence that will haunt the continent for decades.

Even while the specter of instability lurked in the background, some African states made economic progress. The region's overall economic situation remained dire, but eight countries experienced 6 percent or greater growth in gross domestic product. According to a major U.N. report, eased investment restrictions and generous tax incentives now make foreign investment in Africa exceptionally profitable. But, the report noted, such investment remains inadequate to meet the region's need for capital. Population growth, debt, and reliance on primary products continue to complicate economic recovery. Sub-Saharan Africa has a 3.2 percent annual population growth rate (the world's highest), the world's lowest economic growth rate and highest poverty levels, and massive debt burdens representing 255 percent of exports and 83 percent of GNP. Foreign aid, which is a vital source of revenue for many African nations, continues to plummet. Overall U.S. aid to Sub-Saharan Africa declined from \$1.72 billion a year in 1985 to \$1.2 billion in 1992 (even while democratization swept the continent). Some U.S. congressmen have advocated even greater cuts, with the most extreme favoring its abolition. Africa's economic recovery is also hindered by ecological breakdown and persistent health crises. Zaire received worldwide attention in 1995 during an outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus, but other, preventable diseases take an even greater toll across Africa. HIV continues to devastate. Two-thirds of the world's HIV-infected adults are Africans. And not only does the disease affect people, workers and leaders alike, in the prime of life, it has left millions of orphans across the region. Like war, HIV is a disaster whose full impact falls across decades. In such a strategic environment, the coming year should be approached with both guarded optimism and great caution.

To a large extent, Africa's future will be determined by events in the region's strategic giants: Zaire, Nigeria, and South Africa. While Zaire and Nigeria are quite different, the two share increasing political and economic misery. In Zaire, Sese Seko Mobutu remains Africa's longest-reigning dictator. During 1995, the political instability Mobutu unleashed in the early 1990s eased slightly as Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo attempted to engineer economic reform and reconcile Mobutu and Etienne Tshisekedi, leader of the opposition. While movement toward elections stumbles on, the Zairian economy and infrastructure continue to decay. The central government has lost control of most of the outlying regions while ethnic violence and rioting by unpaid military forces threaten security across the country. The chances of Zaire's collapse into total anarchy or its fragmentation remain high.

In Nigeria General Sani Abacha, who seized power in 1994 during a period of chaos growing from annulment of elections by the country's previous military dictator, is among the most repressive and corrupt leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa. On October 1, Abacha announced a transition plan to reinstate civilian rule within 3 years, but few observers have any confidence that he can

or will overcome the problems that undercut previous attempts to build a sustainable democracy. Due to pervasive corruption, mismanagement, and a cutoff of most foreign aid and investment, the Nigerian economy is in a shambles. Within the past decade, the country has fallen from one of Africa's richest nations to one of its poorest. Ethnic tensions remain high. Meanwhile, Nigeria faces increasing international pressure and diplomatic isolation for human rights abuses, including the execution of political activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. This situation will probably escalate. Like Zaire, Nigeria faces the imminent prospect of violence, anarchy, or civil war. This year will be one of great danger for Africa's most populous nation.

South Africa is deep in the difficult process of building a post-apartheid state. Some progress is evident. A surge of investment from the United States and elsewhere provided an economic boost after the election of President Nelson Mandela. At the ceremony celebrating the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, Mandela gave the clearest signal yet that South Africa will assume a leadership role in regional diplomacy and peacekeeping. But inside the nation, there is still the potential for debilitating violence. Unemployment and poverty remain epidemic among blacks, particularly the youth, many of whom are uneducated and accustomed to violence after a decade of struggle against apartheid. The cynicism evident during the November 1995 elections showed that disillusionment is growing from the inability of the ruling African National Congress to make good on election promises. After a lull, political violence in KwaZulu-Natal province between supporters of the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party is surging. South Africa is suffering an explosion of drug use with its accompanying violence. Waves of illegal immigrants from Mozambique and elsewhere are crowding the slums. All of this has combined to create a massive crime problem and an environment of instability. While South Africa's situation is not as dangerous as that in Zaire and Nigeria, the ability of the Mandela government to meet these challenges while simultaneously transcending the legacy of apartheid will play a great part in determining the future of South Africa.

Trends and Issues.

Conventional, interstate war in Sub-Saharan Africa remains unlikely. The foci of security remain internal stability and preventing the spillover of conflicts from neighboring countries. The emphasis on internal stability makes civil-military relations, especially establishing an appropriate political role for the armed forces, an inextricable element of national security. The persistent danger that internal violence in one country will engulf neighboring states makes vital the development of regional mechanisms to prevent, contain, and solve conflicts.

The ability of African societies to produce a cadre of effective, non-corrupt leaders who can craft and implement policies for the consolidation of democracy; ethnic, tribal, and religious reconciliation; sustainable economic growth; population control; and ecological protection will be the most important determinant of the future regional security environment.

The sustainment of democracy depends on continued reform of civil-military relations, including institutionalization of the concept of civilian control of the military. Such reform will depend, in part, on the ability of African nations to develop effective police forces to minimize the military role in domestic law and order, and to build mechanisms for civilian control of national security. Increasing cooperation among the armed forces of Africa's democracies and movement toward reserve-based armed forces could contribute to the reform of civil-military relations.

Conditions in Africa's strategic giants, Zaire, Nigeria, and South Africa, will be vital determinants of the short-term stability of the region. Zaire and Nigeria could disintegrate into anarchy or violence at any time. If this happens, it will probably represent the greatest security challenge Africa has faced in its three-plus decades of independence.

African leaders are attempting to create effective mechanisms for regional solutions to regional conflicts. Many African leaders recognize that the interest of outsiders in preserving security and stability in their region declined precipitously with the end of the Cold War. As a result, they are actively seeking to improve the capability of Africa's states and the Organization of African Unity to prevent, contain, and solve conflicts and to break the culture of violence that has developed during the past two decades. If African leaders are able to build a system for regional conflict prevention and resolution, it could radically transform the African security environment. If they fail, Africa will remain dependent on the transitory interests of outsiders.

U.S. security interests in Africa, though limited, do exist. The objectives are to support democratization and human rights, nurture regional security arrangements and conflict resolution, provide humanitarian assistance, and encourage economic and social development. The watchwords for U.S. strategy in Africa are frugality and economy of force. Against this backdrop, the key questions for future U.S. policy are: (1) To what extent will the American public and Congress support active U.S. engagement in the face of limited national interests and pressing demands from other regions? and (2) What is the appropriate U.S. response if one of Africa's giants collapses into violence, anarchy, or civil war? In particular, it is not clear whether the United States should lead multinational efforts to preempt such a collapse or respond to one if it occurs, or

whether the United States should simply offer assistance to European and African states.

ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Thomas L. Wilborn

Regional Assessment.

East Asia and the Western Pacific is a very dynamic area of the world economically, accounting for more than 36 percent of U.S. trade and containing impressive opportunities for additional profitable trade and investments by U.S. businesses. Unusually high rates of economic growth should continue well into the 21st century, certainly through 2006. The centers of greatest activity will probably continue to shift toward China and Southeast Asia from Northeast Asia, however. But the issues of Taiwan and North Korea, among other factors, will pose potential threats to the stability of the region and U.S. interests for the next several years. In the longer term, the diffusion of modern technologies, including technologies for weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated communications, will be a major force affecting the security environment, especially after the middle of the coming decade.

In response to the visit of Taiwan's President to Cornell in 1995, Beijing launched a sustained vituperative diplomatic and propaganda campaign against Washington and Taipei coupled to military exercises designed to demonstrate quite clearly that China was capable of attacking Taiwan. Jiang Zemin and senior military leaders have explicitly warned that military force will be used to prevent Taiwanese independence. Following as they did on China's aggressive stance in the Spratly Islands dispute, these actions have confirmed widespread fears that a more developed and wealthy China may become a threat to the region's stability.

Developments in China, and the manner in which China approaches disputes with its neighbors, will be one of the major factors influencing regional security for the foreseeable future. If reformers who place a high priority on economic development dominate the Party and government in Beijing, China's behavior may become more cautious and the potential for conflict with Taiwan and other claimants to the Spratly Islands will recede. But if ultranationalists or conservatives gain greater influence as a result of the succession struggle to replace Deng Xiaoping and his cohorts and allow rapid modernization of the People's Liberation Army, serious crises could emerge which would involve not only Taiwan and Southeast Asia, but also even Japan and Russia. A third scenario which could begin to unfold by 2006, anticipated by a number of China specialists, is that the decentralization of authority which has been stimulated by market reforms will accelerate, in part due to the revolution in communications technology, and result in a Soviet-style implosion which will destroy China as a political entity. Just as the replacement of the Soviet Union by 16 states caused instability,

so would the dismemberment of China if it fragmented into several nations.

In the near term, perceptions of what Japan may do in the future will cause concern and influence security decisions by governments in the region, but Japanese behavior probably will not. Domestic Japanese politics are in transition, however, and future Japanese governments, especially if confronted with aggressive Chinese actions, could take a more assertive stance on security issues which would trigger countermeasures throughout the region. Such a scenario could destroy regional stability, and threaten most U.S. interests in East Asia.

Because of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, North Korea has suspended its nuclear program and suspected weapons development. Pyongyang continues to practice brinkmanship, however, and attempts to use Agreed Framework negotiations to acquire greater concessions and weaken the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Moreover, North Korean chemical, biological, and conventional threats persist, although the DPRK's failing economy--exacerbated by natural disasters--has degraded its readiness and capability for launching an attack without warning. While there have been some contacts between Pyongyang and Seoul, the tone has been extremely hostile and confrontational. Actual conflict is unlikely, but tensions between the two Koreas are very high and will remain so for several years. Because of its responsibility in implementing the Agreed Framework, the United States cannot avoid direct involvement in this confrontation. By 2006, however, either there will be a different regime in Pyongyang or the two parts of Korea will have unified. The present North Korean system cannot be sustained for another decade without fundamental economic and political reforms, even with the outside support provided under the Agreed Framework. With reform, reconciliation or (less likely) the status quo are possible alternatives to unification.

The only comprehensive multilateral structure for dealing with security problems within the region is the ASEAN Regional Forum, which includes most regional powers as well as Russia and the United States. Useful as a medium for discussion, it so far offers no operational collective security arrangements. Given the relatively decentralized nature of the present international system when contrasted with the bipolar system of the Cold War, it is the absence of more operational security structures which partially accounts for widespread fears of China and a resurgent Japan, as well as tensions and conflict between smaller states over territory and other disputes. According to many observers, these conditions account for increased military spending by many East Asian states at a time when most nations in other regions of the world are spending less. Prospects for operational security organizations before 2006 are not good, although *ad hoc* arrangements to perform concrete tasks, such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization established under the Agreed Framework, may be created to meet specific needs.

South Asia.

The most serious security issue in South Asia remains the dispute between India and Pakistan over the states of Jammu and Kashmir. Both nations have repeatedly resorted to skirmishes, and sometimes direct conflict, over this seemingly unsolvable issue since partition in 1947. With both nations presumably capable of assembling and deploying nuclear weapons in a short time, a future conflict between them could be extremely serious and have very broad international consequences. The nascent nuclear capability which would make conflict escalation so destructive also tends to make it less likely.

The security of South Asia is also threatened by the existence of many ethnic and/or religious separatist groups in most countries. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil separatists and the government are engaged in a bloody civil war. India, Pakistan, and, to a lesser extent, Bangladesh are also centers of ethnic tensions which interfere with economic and political development, endanger domestic tranquility, and occasionally lead to violence. Because of the growing inability of central governments to adequately govern their territories, it is likely that problems with insurgencies will become more frequent and serious. There is evidence that India and Pakistan deliberately foster and inflame domestic discord in each other's territory. Since both governments are deterred from attacking each other due to the risk of nuclear war, such covert and indirect activities will probably increase over the next decade.

U.S. Engagement and Military Presence.

Many governments and observers still express concern that the United States will decrease its engagement in the region, with destabilizing consequences. These apprehensions have been reduced, but not yet eliminated, by the *United States Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific Region*, published in February 1995, which pledges that the U.S. military presence will be maintained indefinitely. Yet popular dissatisfaction with the status of forces agreements for U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan, the only remaining hosts for the U.S. military in the region, raises doubts that current deployments can be sustained indefinitely. Before 2006, a number of challenges to U.S. deployments in Korea and Japan are possible.

U.S. leaders, as well as leaders of governments in the region, will be required to articulate the rationale for continued U.S. military presence in Asia and the Pacific if that presence is to continue for another decade. Most observers agree that the more destabilizing developments which could occur in the region are less likely to take place, and are more likely to be resolved without conflict if they do take place, provided U.S. forward presence is maintained.

Trends and Issues.

The spread of communications technologies, especially among the economically dynamic states, will have a profound impact on politics within the region. The information control now exercised by authoritarian regimes will become extremely difficult, if not impossible to maintain.

By 2006, most Asia-Pacific nations will possess the technology, and many will have the capability, to produce chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons.

The region will remain economically dynamic well into the 21st century. Most nations will achieve record economic growth and virtually all countries will see their economies expand to some extent.

Within East Asia, the U.S. military presence is widely credited with preserving stability. The relationships among the U.S. military presence, stability, and economic development should be major determinants of U.S. security policy for the region.

The behavior of China will be one of the most important influences on regional security well beyond 2006. The United States must correctly identify the nature of the People's Republic of China if Washington's security policy for the region is to be viable.

Two East Asian disputes, both involving China, could reach crisis proportions in the near term: the status of Taiwan and the dispute over the Spratly Islands. The manner in which they are resolved--and the outcomes--will affect U.S. regional interests.

Implementation of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework will require more time and money than originally intended. The United States will remain in the center of this dispute until it is resolved.

Multinational security consultation in the Asia-Pacific Region is maturing. Subregional fora, supplementing the ASEAN Regional Forum, and expanded "second track" (private security specialists and officials acting in their private capacities) organizations are likely to appear. While *ad hoc* multilateral operational organizations, such as the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization established under the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, will remain uncommon, they will also become accepted as legitimate tools for peaceful change.

Mainland Southeast Asia, as well as parts of China, will be increasingly vulnerable to international heroin distributors.

THE FUTURE

William J. Doll

An Assessment.

The changes we have seen in the recent past are only a prelude to future change. The major theme well into the next century will be the impact of unfolding technologies on geopolitical, economic, environmental and social structures and systems. These changes in themselves will continue to be fairly dramatic, but of greater importance will be the rate of change, particularly among post-capitalist nations. Fueling this will be a real time, many-to-many, global communications system.

The increased access people, corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and governmental institutions have to information and data will be the most notable feature of the next two decades. Alone, data and information are not particularly useful. Indeed, a surfeit of information can be a hindrance rather than a help. But the refinement of data and information into useful and applicable knowledge is dramatic. Mankind's ability to do that must and will increase at an exponential rate well past 2006. Since no one can control the rise of knowledge and no group can manage it, artificial intelligence has to be developed to meet this challenge. Thereafter, controlling the artificial intelligence will become problematic.

As post-capitalist nations embrace the challenges and benefits to be derived from new technologies, second and third order nations will find it more difficult to compete. This will take place at a time when expectations are rising in these countries, and as both regional and global regimes become more powerful. The ends of the continuum between first order nations and third order nations and failed states will become greater. Simultaneously, national sovereignty will continue to wane while economics emerges as the driving force in global geo-politics. Non-governmental organizations from multinational corporations to human rights and environmental groups will be able to wield far more power than in the past as they use Information Age technologies to promote their agendas. "Cyber villages," and even "cyber nations" will arise as geographical boundaries become less and less significant. Migration of people presents one set of security problems, but migration of ideas, loyalties, and interests via the internet is another that may, ultimately, be more important. In the Information Age, national borders are far more ambiguous and cultures more susceptible to "electronic" penetration. In the midst of all this there will be a rising new global generation that is increasingly technology literate, has profound expectations, seeks empowerment, and absorbs American cultural offerings through television, videos, and movies. The global teenager, with a *weltanschauung* shaped by MTV, will soon be a reality. The global adult generation is then only one iteration away.

Demographic change will increase in rapidity as global populations become more urbanized. This will exact a heavy toll in poverty among third order nations, prompting increased migration to first order nations like the United States and the countries of Western Europe. With so many variables the future itself will be more complex than we may be ready to understand or accept. Currently, the rate of change is uncontrollable and one can only speculate as to the ability of future institutions to manage change.

Wildcards.

As these dynamics operate to alter and illuminate the world, independent variables or "wildcards" may result in evolutionary or sudden adverse impacts on global security.

The inability of individual nations to accept and manage rapid and destabilizing change resulting in the fragmentation of the political status quo.

The inability of nations to form alliances to manage and control rogue states, terrorist groups, and international crime syndicates.

The failure of the United States and the other G-7 powers to balance budgets, solve debt and deficit problems, thus fostering a global depression.

China's failure to evolve into a quasi-capitalist nation with even modest democratic institutions.

Russia's degeneration even further politically, economically, and environmentally. How much it degenerates will determine how much negative impact this will have on Europe and Asia.

Abrupt migrations of large magnitude that ignite some form of conflict.

Advances in biotechnology, especially in genetic engineering, that provide opportunities but that also raise moral and ethical issues.

The inability of nations, organizations, and individuals to manage and distinguish information, misinformation, and disinformation.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY

Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

America's Army Today.

In February 1991, the United States Army that decisively expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait was a product of the Cold War; a force designed to deter aggression by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and, should deterrence fail, fight to victory. It was a preeminent ground force, one rebuilt from the ashes of the Vietnam War, honed in exercises at the National Training Center and elsewhere, and tested in Grenada and Panama. The Army was, even then, moving from being an Industrial Age army to an Information Age force. While that Army is today a force in transition, one capable of acting in concert with sister services and allied forces to achieve battlefield dominance through simultaneous and parallel attacks, it must remain trained and ready for decisive military action into the 21st century.

Even before the Army deployed to Saudi Arabia in the late summer and autumn of 1991, its leadership knew that the strategic paradigm was shifting. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, it was apparent that the Army was going to downsize. But Army leaders understood that tomorrow's land force could not be a lightened-up version of its former self. Accordingly, the Army undertook a reasoned process to compel changes that would provide for a force capable of effectively supporting friends and allies as well as delivering decisive victory whenever called upon to fight and win the nation's wars. Force XXI was that process implemented by which America's Army has embarked upon its journey into the next century. If the Army is to remain *the world's best Army*, it must have the appropriate doctrine, force structures, organization, training and the finest weapons the nation can provide.

The Challenges Ahead.

The analysts at the Army's Strategic Studies Institute do not foresee the rise of a global peer competitor capable of challenging the Army through the next decade. Initially, that may seem reassuring, in actuality it is not. In the past, non-peer competitors proved difficult adversaries when the world's premier Industrial Age army engaged agrarian age forces in Korea and Vietnam. Historically, conventional military forces have almost always fared better against forces with similar structures, doctrines, equipment and training. One need only consider the *Grande Armee's* problems in Spain during the Napoleonic War, the Wehrmacht's difficulties fighting Partisans in the mountains of Yugoslavia, as well as the U.S. Army's experiences in Korea and Vietnam to know that non-peer competitors can be troublesome.

Furthermore, and perhaps more important, non-peer competitors may be encouraged to challenge the Army, even with

the understanding that they are incapable of defeating it. They will be emboldened by the knowledge that they require only that military capability necessary to elevate the potential cost of intervention above the threshold of what will be considered acceptable by the American body politic. The threshold will be high where America's vital interests are involved and, thus, the defense of those interests is relatively assured. However, that threshold will be lower for non-vital interests and, therefore, these are the interests that potential aggressors are most likely to challenge. If the Army is to have the capabilities to deter and, when necessary, to compel calculating aggressors of this nature, it must be able to resolve conflicts at levels where human and economic costs are sufficiently low to justify intervention. Otherwise, extortion of the Army's ability to promote and protect non-vital interests will result.

While no global peer competitor is on the horizon, the Army could find itself confronted by one of at least three significant regional powers: North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. The armed forces fielded by these nations will be large, relatively well-equipped, and capable of undertaking robust military operations within their regions. If need be, today's Army would prevail decisively against any one of them, perhaps even two simultaneously, as required by the Bottom-Up Review. But the Army would be hard-pressed also to fulfill its peacekeeping and support obligations like those underway in Haiti and Bosnia.

Currently, Russia is, if not an ally, at least not the adversary it was during the Soviet era. But given the current drift of Russian domestic politics, that could change. If Russia reinvents itself under the leadership of ultra-nationalists bent on recapturing imperial glory, or by rejuvenated Communists intent on reviving the perceived grandeur of their recent Soviet past, the political and military challenges for the European democracies will be significant. While Russia will not have the resources to become a global peer competitor with conventional weapons, it will be able to field a large, well-armed, and ably-led force to present a significant regional threat. Furthermore, its future political leadership may be less predictable than its Communist predecessors. Given that Russia's nuclear arsenal will remain substantial, under certain circumstances Russia may have the potential for presenting a more dangerously volatile threat to peace than at any time in recent history.

As the next century unfolds, China and the United States could become strategic partners in a cooperative endeavor built on trust, trade, and mutual respect, or a more adversarial relationship might develop. Currently, China is modernizing its military. It remains determined to prevent Taiwan from declaring the independence it manifests on a defacto basis. Any attempt to resolve the Taiwan question with force will present the United States with a crisis, one which might well involve military force. Currently, China has the capability of fielding a large, semi-modern army. While the People's Liberation Army will not

become the kind of Information Age force that the U.S. Army will be; it will be able to conduct effective combat operations in Asia.

The Army must be postured to deter and prepared for these five great challenges. But every day the full spectrum of conflict, war, natural disaster and disease is apparent throughout a very troubled world. Neither our interests nor resources will lead the United States to intervene in all--or even a majority--of those less strategically compelling situations. On the other hand, the analysts at SSI are unanimous in the view that the United States will decide in some, perhaps many, cases to deploy forces to meet a variety of such challenges. Thugs armed with assault rifles and machetes, narco-terrorists with access to some of the most sophisticated and destructive weapons, and terrorists operating at the behest of legitimate regimes whose aims are inimicable to our own will present unique and dangerous challenges to American interests around the world. The United States, usually acting in coalition with other responsible states, will have to be prepared to deal with these diverse and dangerous threats to the safety and well-being of all humanity.

Above all, the Army must remain ready to fight and win the nation's wars. It must be able to *compel* any enemy to accede to its will through the decisive employment of military force. If the Army can do that, then it is likely to *deter* many potential adversaries. But beyond deterring potential enemies and decisively defeating those who are not deterred, the Army must be able to *reassure* our friends and allies.

During the Cold War the United States looked to its NATO and other allies to stand with us in deterring aggression. In the troubled world of the 21st century, allies will remain an integral part of the strategic equation, helping us meet the diverse range of challenges that will emerge. The credibility of the United States rests on the trust our allies have in both our capabilities and determination to employ military force in behalf of their mutual interests. The ability to provide visible and tangible evidence of America's land force power is the key to reassurance. Whether that means protecting an ethnic minority in one part of the world or putting in the right amount of force to ensure that no regional hegemon miscalculates and attacks a friend or ally, the Army must be ready and able to perform a variety of missions quickly and effectively. A well-armed force, on the ground, in the future as in the past, remains the most profoundly tangible symbol of national resolve.

Finally, domestic crises and natural disasters will be a part of the next decade just as they have been a part of American history from before the Republic was founded. The nation will continue to look to the Army as the only organization with the extant capability of providing the kind of disaster relief it rendered during Hurricane Andrew in 1992 when over 28,000

soldiers assisted hundreds of thousands of their fellow Americans in need. Whether fighting forest fires, quelling domestic unrest, or keeping order in the wake of an earthquake or violent storm, the Army will have to be ready to support the needs of the nation within its own borders. Furthermore, only the U.S. Army, in conjunction with its sister services, possesses the capabilities needed to provide relief throughout the world when disaster strikes.

While these challenges are daunting, there are historical precedents upon which tomorrow's Army can draw today. The U.S. Army has been the decisive force in every successful war since the American Revolution. From the Spanish American War to the present, even with large numbers of troops deployed overseas during the Cold War, the Army has been a power projection force. It has fought in coalition with diverse allies in two world wars, and in Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf. The Army has been used domestically to quell rebellions, preserve the Union, and to open up and secure the American frontier. Two centuries ago West Point began producing engineers who helped to build the transportation infrastructure--the canals, highways, and railroads--throughout the nation. The Army was in San Francisco in 1906 to reestablish order after the great earthquake. During the Depression, the Army helped establish Civilian Conservation Corps encampments. In the turbulent 1960s, troops were sent to Watts, Detroit, and many other cities to quell domestic unrest. These are not new missions, and the Army of the 21st century will be as effective in compelling and deterring potential adversaries as it will be in reassuring allies and supporting people in need.

America's Army faces a variety of challenges and, with the support of the American people, it will rise to the occasion. The Army's vision will be articulated within an uncertain strategic context and each of the regionalists at SSI agree that the coming decade will be filled with turbulence and unrest. The vision is that the Army of the 21st century must remain *the world's best Army*, a source for providing forces to meet the broad range of unpredictable challenges that lies ahead.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK is the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute where he has served since 1989. Prior to that, Dr. Blank was Associate Professor for Soviet Studies at the Air University's Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education. He earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian history at the University of Chicago. Dr. Blank has published numerous articles on Soviet and Russian military affairs and foreign policies. He is the co-editor of *The Soviet Military and the Future* (Greenwood, 1992). His latest book, a study of the Soviet Commissariat of Nationalities, *The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities*, was published by Greenwood in 1994. Dr. Blank, working with Professor Alvin Rubinstein of the University of Pennsylvania, is currently editing a book on Russian foreign policy in Asia and the Far East.

WILLIAM J. DOLL was appointed the National Guard Advisor to the Strategic Studies Institute in January 1994. A Judge Advocate General's Corps officer, Colonel Doll flew AH-1 Cobra gunships in Vietnam and served in aviation assignments in the United States. He is the coauthor of an SSI study entitled *The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and Solutions*. Colonel Doll is serving as SSI's futurist. He earned his B.A. in political science at Michigan State University, a J.D. from Mercer University and an M.P.A. from Brenau College. Colonel Doll was a National Security Fellow at Harvard University and is a graduate of both the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U. S. Army War College.

WILLIAM T. JOHNSON is an Associate Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute. An infantry officer before retiring from the U.S. Army, he served in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division (Light). He also served as Assistant Professor of Military History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control Analyst in SHAPE. Dr. Johnson earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in military history at Duke University. In 1994, he was named to the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Johnson is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Army War College.

STEVEN METZ is the Henry L. Stimson Professor of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College. Prior to joining the Strategic Studies Institute in 1993, Dr. Metz was Associate Professor of Low Intensity Conflict at the Air War College and Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has written on topics ranging from nuclear warfighting to South African security policy and U.N. peace operations. Dr. Metz earned his B.A. in philosophy and M.A. in international studies at the University of South Carolina and his Ph.D. in political science at the Johns Hopkins University.

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE, Research Professor of National Security Affairs, earned his Ph.D. in Middle East politics at the University of California, Berkeley. He has taught at the University of California, Berkeley; at Ripon College in Wisconsin; and at Union College, Schenectady, NY. His latest SSI study is *The Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement*. Dr. Pelletiere is the author of two books on the Middle East: *The Kurds-An Unstable Element in the Gulf*, and *The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum*. He is completing a book on the war in Kuwait.

DONALD E. SCHULZ, Professor of National Security Affairs, earned his Ph.D. in political science at Ohio State University. He is the author of numerous articles on Latin America that have appeared in *Foreign Policy*, *Orbis*, the *Journal of Inter-American Studies* and *World Affairs*, and *Small Wars and Insurgencies*. In 1995, he focused on Mexico, and his latest book, *Mexico Faces the 21st Century*, was published in last year by Praeger Press. Dr. Schulz is working on an SSI study on the prospects for stability in Haiti after the departure of U.N. troops.

EARL H. TILFORD, JR., Senior Research Professor and Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute, earned his B.A. and M.A. in history at the University of Alabama and his Ph.D. in American and European military history at George Washington University. His 1993 book, *Crosswinds: The Air Force's Setup in Vietnam*, was published by Texas A&M University Press. In 1996, Praeger Press will publish *Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back on the Persian Gulf War*, a book he co-edited with Air Force historian Dr. William P. Head.

THOMAS L. WILBORN is a Research Professor of National Security Affairs and Asian specialist at the Strategic Studies Institute. He earned his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Kentucky and has taught international relations and political science courses at James Madison University and Central Missouri University. Dr. Wilborn joined SSI in 1975 and authored numerous studies over the last two decades, his most recent being *Strategic Implications of the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement*.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG, Research Professor of National Security Affairs, came to the Strategic Studies Institute in 1988. He earned his Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, in Geneva, Switzerland, and is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Young was Executive Committee Chairman of the Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff Talks' Working Group on Command Authorities Required for a Multinational Force Commander.

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